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ABSTRACT
While researchers have developed rigorous practices for oﬄine housing audits to enforce
the Fair Housing Act, the online world lacks similar practices. In this work we lay out
principles for developing an online fairness audit and demonstrate two examples; gender-
and race-based discrimination in online housing advertisements, and personalized recom-
mendation ordering. We employ a controlled sock-puppet audit technique to build online
profiles associated with a specific demographic profile or intersection of profiles, and describe
the requirements to train and verify profiles of other demographics. We also describe the
process used to collect data for the two audits using these sock-puppet profiles. In the first
we collect ads served on several sites in order to determine whether the number of housing-
related ads served is dependent on the perceived race or gender of the profile. The second
compares the ordering of personalized recommendations on major housing and real-estate
sites. Using statistical tests, we examine whether the results seen in these areas exhibit
indirect discrimination: whether there is correlation between the content served and users’
protected features, even if the system does not know or use these features explicitly. We
believe this framework provides a compelling foundation for further exploration of housing
fairness online.
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For the victims of bad algorithms and systematic oppression.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Online tracking and algorithmic personalization have opened up complicated new legal,
ethical, and policy questions regarding bias and discrimination. As more and more informa-
tion from users becomes available online, many platforms employ personalization algorithms
to target information to users based on their usage behavior. While this might improve
the efficiency of information consumption by users, it can also introduce bias along many
dimensions including discrimination against a specific group of users (e.g. based on race and
gender) [1]. The effects of such biases can perpetuate inequality, and even constitute illegal
conduct in some areas [2].
Housing is one area where discrimination based on a protected class (including gender,
race, color, disability, religion, familial status, or national origin) is subject to fairness reg-
ulations. In the United States of America, the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §3601-3619),
often abbreviated FHA, makes it illegal for a landlord or seller to refuse to sell, rent to, or
negotiate with a person due to their inclusion in a protected class.
In order to enforce these housing laws, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) performs regular audits to determine whether potential buyers or renters
received differential treatment based on one of these protected classes. These studies are
generally structured as a paired test [3, 4]. In this style of audit, two testers pose as prospec-
tive buyer or renters who differ only in protected classes. The participants reach out to
real-estate agents and landlords asking to be shown houses on the market that fit specific
criteria, and record which properties they are shown and how they are treated. Because
all other attributes such as income are controlled, any difference in treatment is noted as
possible discrimination.
The internet, however, has changed the the way people search for housing, making the
traditional audits inadequate. Users now have access to listing information that was previ-
ously only available to real-estate agents or landlords. Significant portions of the housing
search can now take place on property listing sites, housing search engines, and targeted
advertising, removing traditional audit subjects from the process. Each of these can per-
sonalize their results to users, potentially introducing bias. This bias can be experienced
by users in a variety of ways. For example, a specific listing or ad may not be shown to
anyone that falls within specific demographic constraints. Members of one group may be
given different information about price or availability. One group may receive significantly
more advertisements for a property than another. Each of these actions could be in violation
of the Fair Housing Act if performed based on a protected class.
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The many forms of potential bias in online housing, along with the inadequacy of tra-
ditional housing audits, have resulted in calls for new audit techniques [2]. However, the
complexity and opacity of the online algorithmic platforms that provide housing informa-
tion to users makes auditing these platforms much more challenging than traditional housing
providers. One of the main challenges to this style of audit is building accurate and realistic
profiles. In traditional oﬄine audits, researchers are able to control for protected attributes
such as race and gender by selecting names and testers who match the desired character-
istics. This type of user-provided profile information is not generally provided to housing
websites. In many of these systems, such attributes are inferred indirectly via statistical
models which are not available to outside researchers and auditors. In addition to control-
ling for protected attributes, it is also a challenge to control for a user’s behavior in an online
housing audit. Such challenges have made transferring oﬄine housing audits to the online
world quite difficult.
In this work we take steps towards building online housing audits to investigate gender-
based and race-based discrimination in the context of online housing advertisements and
search-result ranking. We demonstrate a sock-puppet browsing technique for building agents
associated with a specific demographic profile, and discuss methods of validating that these
profiles are classified correctly by advertising networks. We train profiles using this system
to perform two audits of online housing systems. In the first audit we examine whether there
is correlation between number of housing ads served to users and their protected features,
regardless of the system’s knowledge or use of these features. Our results show significant
differences in the number of housing advertisements shown to agents of different races. In
the second audit, we analyze differences in the way the listings are ordered, and show that a
major property listing site’s orders recommended listings differently depending on a visitor’s
gender. Finally, we discuss how the framework outlined in this paper can provide a basis for
further exploration and audits.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
This work focuses on audits, defined here as systematic evaluations of organizations, net-
works, or marketplaces. These are generally performed by independent researchers, often
treating the test subject as a black-box. These evaluations aim to prove, or disprove, that
the system being tested meets formal standards.
In this paper we are concerned with whether the online housing markets provide fair
outcomes for users regardless of gender or race.
2.1 FAIRNESS DEFINITIONS
The first step in this process is defining fairness and bias. Clearly and precisely defining
“fairness” can be quite complicated as it varies between disciplines and contexts. A recent
survey [5] identified more than 20 definitions of fairness. Many of these fit into larger
categorizations by the method, target, or purpose of the discrimination. Previous auditing
studies have particularly looked at two categorizations of fairness: direct vs. indirect and
individual vs. group fairness [6, 7, 8, 9].
In the direct/indirect categorization of fairness, the focus is on the method of discrimi-
nation [10]. Direct discrimination occurs when rules or procedures explicitly impose “dis-
proportionate burdens” on minority or disadvantaged groups. Indirect (or systematic) dis-
crimination is caused by rules or procedures that impose disproportionate burdens without
explicitly targeting the specific groups. This includes tactics such as redlining which are
designed to discriminate based on racially homogeneous neighborhoods. In algorithmic sys-
tems, this categorization of fairness means whether a system takes a protected attribute as
direct input or whether the output of the system correlates with some protected attributes,
even if these attributes are not used as direct inputs of the system.
Individual/group fairness is based on how subjects are selected from the groups being
studied [11]. Individual fairness requires that two similar individuals receive similar treat-
ment. The counterpart, group fairness, requires that demographic subsets of the population
are treated equally. These two measurements are not always equivalent, as deciding features
may not be evenly spread throughout a population. Within the context of housing, individ-
ual fairness states that two prospective customers who differ only in protected traits should
be shown the same properties and offered the same rates. Group fairness requires that, on
average, a random member of one group should receive the same treatment as a random
member of the other. These outcomes can differ based on the distribution of income, net
3
worth, or education within these groups.
Individual fairness provides the metric for many of the fairness laws in the United States
of America: housing (42 U.S.C. §3601-3619), employment (42 U.S.C. §2000e), and public
accommodations (42 U.S.C. §2000a). As such, audits focusing on these areas often use it as
well. A recent study by Thebault-Spieker et al. of online reputations systems compared the
ratings given to gig workers [12]. Participants were given a name, photo, and piece of work,
and asked to rate the quality of the work. Because the same piece of work could be paired
with any number of profiles, each of the workers is effectively equal, and any differences in
the rating of the work can be attributed to bias based on the profile.
Group unfairness, and specifically indirect group unfairness, is often studied in situations
where there are no existing fairness policies. A study in 2015 analyzed the effects of geog-
raphy on digital crowdsourcing platforms [13]. It showed that the time it took to travel to
a potential job and the relative wealth of the task area play a large part in the worker’s
decision to take a job. This rewards workers from areas with a higher socio-economic status
since they do not have to travel the same distance, and therefore systematically discourages
poorer and minority workers from the gig economy.
Throughout this paper we will define bias using the HUD definition of disparate impact.
This states that “(the) illustrations of unlawful housing discrimination in this part may be
established by a practice’s discriminatory effect, even if not motivated by discriminatory
intent” (78 FR 11459). Therefore, when we conclude that a system is biased we do not
attribute any malice to that fact; it is a simple statement that the outcomes or effects are
different across demographics.
In this paper, we investigate indirect individual fairness in online housing by evaluating
whether two profiles that differ only in gender or race receive the same housing information.
2.2 HOUSING BIAS
Housing discrimination has been a topic of active research for more than half a century
[3], but the introduction of the internet has substantially enlarged the area. Here we discuss
both online and oﬄine housing audits.
2.2.1 Traditional Housing Audits
Housing discrimination in non-internet contexts has been a topic of interest and research
for decades. The first nation-wide HUD Housing Discrimination Survey (HDS) was per-
formed in 1977, and additionally national studies have been performed in 1989, 2000, 2012
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[3]. The 2012 audit showed continued decreases in overall discrimination, but still significant
differences in the treatment of prospective renters and buyers along demographic lines.
The Fair Housing Act reaches beyond the search process as well. The places and methods
of advertising housing must be fair. The initial interpretation of the law was that a seller
cannot post an advertisement that directly excludes members of a protected class. A 1991
decision in Ragin v. New York Times (923 F.2d 995 (1991)) ruled that implicit discrimination
fell within the law, and therefore that showing people of color primarily in service roles
constituted illegal discrimination. Additionally, §109.25.a of the HUD regulations make it
clear that limiting the reach of advertisements to demographically homogeneous areas falls
afoul of the FHA as well.
2.2.2 Online Housing Bias
Recent studies of bias on the online rental site Airbnb [14, 15] show significant racial bias
against prospective renters with distinctively African American names. The most recent [15]
demonstrated that African American users were turned down for rentals 58 percent of the
time, as opposed to Caucasian renters who were turned down only 50 percent of the time.
These results reaffirm previous studies on racial bias in online rentals both in the United
States [16, 17, 18] and in Europe [19]. In each of these experiments, researchers emailed
landlords to inquire about vacant apartments advertised online and signed the emails with
names that implied the senders’ race. In all of the studies, customers with traditionally non-
English/American names received fewer responses overall and more negative responses. The
prevalence of such biases in housing, along with the opacity of online algorithmic housing
platforms, have raised requests for algorithmic housing audits during recent years [20, 21].
2.3 COMPUTATIONAL AUDITS
As discussed in the previous section, the principles of audits have begun to be applied
to computational systems. These have not only been confined to online housing, but have
expanded to diverse topics from health information to social networks to search engines.
Information security has presented several unique audit contexts due to the variety and
value of the information involved. Previous papers have covered system designs to describe
audit methods for structures from the underlying network topology [22] all the way up to a
complex heterogeneous web service [23].
Privacy has also been a vital area for computational audits. [24] describe privacy audits for
social network sites that would enable users to more easily determine how their data is being
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shared [24]. Another paper by Bates et al. describes how government-sponsored wiretapping
programs can be amended to allow open and transparent auditing from tamper-resistant logs
[25]. Finally, [26] describe a system for auditing medical record, a system which is heavily
protected by privacy law, but requires substantial oversight as medical records change hands
[26].
2.3.1 Sock-puppet Audits
The methods demonstrated in this paper fall into a style known as “sock-puppet” audits.
The term sock-puppet refers to automated systems that mimic realistic, but controlled, user
behavior. This enables repeatable tests while still offering results generalizable to human
users.
The AdFisher paper by Datta et al. [6] described a method of building user profiles
to mimic profiles of differing demographics using automated browsing as well as explicit
advertisement settings. Their experiments used these sock-puppets to explore a wide range
of different topics including transparency and equality. We will discuss some of their finding
in greater detail in a later sub-section.
Online marketplaces present a situation ripe for bias and discrimination since users have no
ability to see the prices available to their peers. Hannk et al. described an audit strategy for
detecting differential pricing online [27] using a combination of voluntarily submitted brows-
ing profiles and algorithmically generated browsing behavior. Their experiments showed that
more than half of the e-commerce sites audited performed some level of personalization.
The many types of potential bias in online systems, including price discrimination, have
resulted in calls for auditing online algorithmic systems [28]. The two types of bias on which
we have chosen to focus are advertising bias and ranking bias. Below, we briefly describe
these biases and discuss existing audits in each space.
2.3.2 Auditing Advertising Bias
As was discussed in section 2.2.1, the contents and presentation of an advertisement can
have discriminatory effects. Marketing dangerous or predatory topics to minority audi-
ences can have profound effects on economic, physical, psychological, and societal health
[29]. Empowering this with personalized online tracking and targeting may improve the
advertisement’s efficiency, but it can reinforce existing biases and inequalities by training
algorithmic systems with biased data, or for biased outcomes.
For example, Google search results for stereotypically African American names return ads
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containing the word “arrest” significantly more than for white names [30]. This creates both
individual harms in circumstances such as job searches where employers routinely search
for information about the applicant, but it also creates societal harms by reinforcing racist
stereotypes that African Americans are more likely to commit crime.
In another example, Datta et al. found that women in their study received fewer ads
encouraging them to take high paying jobs than men [6]. They attribute this to a few
unique ads that were shown thousands of times over the course of the audit that were highly
correlated with the gender of the user.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Facebook received a fair housing complaint against them in
August 2018 (Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing & Equal Opportunity v. Facebook) for
allowing advertisers to explicitly target customers that belong to demographic groups.
A very recent study by Ali et al. showed that modern advertising platforms (specifically
Facebook) can cause discriminatory effects without the advertiser’s input or awareness [31].
This presents a dangerous possibility of unwittingly reinforcing negative stereotypes that
have been “learned” by a complex system.
2.3.3 Auditing Ranking Bias
The influence of search engines has greatly accelerated the study of ranking effects on user
interaction. Users overwhelmingly favor the top results in search pages[32, 33]. Keane et al.
demonstrated that users continued to click on the top links in Google search results even if
the order of the results was reversed [34].
Because ordering can effect decision making so drastically, it is important that the ranking
algorithm is fair. A 2018 study analyzed bias in resume search results [7]. It measured
whether there were significant differences between the ranking of male and female job seekers
based on inferred gender. The study concluded that the systems were generally fair on an
individual basis, but that there was significant group bias against feminine candidates.
In this work, we investigate advertising and ranking bias in online housing by providing
online advertising and housing listing platforms different inputs and evaluating the difference
in outputs. This method involves many challenges including profile building, and controlling
for protected attributes while imitating real users’ behavior that we describe below.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experiments aimed to answer the following questions:
• Does the perceived race and gender of a user searching for housing online affect the
number and/or type of housing advertisements served to that individual? If so, why?
• Does the ranking algorithm for recommended properties on housing listing sites Trulia
and Realtor.com weight property attributes differently based on the perceived race or
gender of the visitor? If so, how do those weights change?
• Do the profile training techniques presented in this research produce advertising profiles
that are significantly differentiated and reflect the desired attributes?
Our experimental design for the first two questions drew inspiration from previous au-
dits in the space, especially the nation-wide HUD Housing Discrimination Survey [3, 2].
These follow the pattern of paired-testing discussed in chapters 1 and 2, where each test is
performed by at least two individuals who differ only in protected classes.
Each audit or experiment consisted of hundreds of agents making dozens of measurements.
An agent’s life cycle consisted of two main steps: 1) training a browser profile and 2)
collecting experimental data. Details on the methods of profile training and testing are
covered in greater detail in chapter 4, and data collection in sections 5.1 and 6.1
In this section we will discuss the scope, technical details, and terminology of these audits.
3.1 SCOPE
There are a nearly limitless number of audits that could be performed in this area, consid-
ering the number of legally protected attributes, size of the United States housing market,
and breadth of online services involved in housing. Even performing the simplest audits
required limiting several of these variables.
3.1.1 Demographics
Each agent in the experiment was assigned an identity at the intersection of two demo-
graphic categories: race and gender. All other protected classes were controlled by removing
any related topics so that additional variables would not confound the results.
The first set of categories we considered was gender. Agents were assigned to either the
male or female profile training. We recognize that this does not account for transgender or
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non-binary individuals. However, a lack of data on browsing behavior for these individuals
made it prohibitively difficult to define a profile training strategy to include these individuals.
The other categorization was by racial or ethnic background, labeling agents as either
Caucasian, African American, Hispanic, or Asian. These were chosen as they are the four
largest racial and ethnic groups in the United States. This category is referred to as “race”
throughout this paper, although there is active debate as to whether a Hispanic background
is racial or ethnic in nature. We chose to use the term race because two-thirds of Hispanic
Americans consider their background as part of their racial identity [35]. Additionally, this
decision enabled simpler terminology across the audits.
3.1.2 Locations
This audit focused on two areas: the Chicago, Illinois metropolitan area and the Cham-
paign/Urbana, Illinois area.
We chose to include Chicago in this audit due to both size and demographics. The city
is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States, and therefore will have a very
large number of properties available at any time. A smaller town or city may be unable to
show the same level of personalization simply because there are fewer available properties
for the site to display. Additionally, the Chicago area is both one of the most diverse and
most segregated cities in the United States[36]. This increases verisimilitude because it is
realistic that a person of that gender or race would be searching for a property in that area.
It also presents a situation ripe for racial redlining, where landlords or sellers sort buyers
into neighborhoods by race.
We included the Champaign/Urbana area in order to compare a smaller community to
Chicago. It is still somewhat racially diverse, with Hispanic, African American, and Asian
populations each comprising at least 10% of the population [37]. Furthermore, it is one of
the largest metropolitan areas in Illinois after Chicago, and therefore has a housing market
large enough for a variety of listings in different areas and at different price-points.
3.1.3 Timeline
Agents were run in blocks, where a mixture of differing profiles were trained and executed
simultaneously. This was done to control for unintended effects that might be caused by
changes to the site or network during the course of the experiment.
Blocks of training and collection were scheduled throughout the week and at varying times
in order to minimize any data that might be inferred due to the day or time an agent visited
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a page.
We started collecting results for the advertising audit in early August 2018, and started
collecting ranking data in early December 2018. We continued collecting both through mid-
March, however we limited the data we analyzed in the Advertising audit to ads collected
before February 2019. We chose to limit the data due to the release of several large stories
focusing of Facebook’s handling of housing ads [38, 39]. Although these stories did not
directly affect our data sources, there was still a possibility that the increased scrutiny in
this area would cause the sites we were to testing to change their behavior and invalidate
the study.
3.2 TECHNICAL DETAILS
At the beginning of the experiment each agent is represented as a fresh browser profile
with no cookies or history. Next, the agent is assigned both a gender and race. It browses
the internet following specific patterns in order to build a representative browser profile.
Finally, the trained profile visits target sites and collects experimental data for analysis.
Each agent was represented by a browser profile in a discrete instance of Firefox 63 running
on an Ubuntu 16.04 server. The browser instances were controlled by the Python program-
ming language and the Selenium automation framework. All browsing traffic was routed
through a proxy so that it would appear to originate in the correct geographic location.
3.3 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
agent An agent is an individual participant in the experiment. In a traditional audit this
term would correspond to an experimenter performing the audit. In this framework,
an agent refers to a unique browser profile.
profile When used within the context of profile training, the term profile refers to the set
of data collected by an advertising network about a single user.
protected class A demographic category upon which it is illegal to discriminate. Under
United States housing law these include gender, race, color, disability, religion, familial
status, or national origin.
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CHAPTER 4: PROFILE TRAINING
Because our audit follows the pattern of paired testing, we required a method of providing
data about participants (such as age, gender, or race) to the subjects of the audit, online
advertising networks and housing sites. This meant building a profile on these sites.
These profiles represent prospective home buyers who differ in gender and race, but are
similar in location, income, and other important categories. This was done by browsing
sites that were disproportionately visited by members of a specific demographic group. This
method of inferred profile building was used for two reasons: necessity and verisimilitude.
First, there was no acceptable option for self-selection in the agent’s advertising profiles. In
earlier papers the experimenters had direct control over interests and visibility into inferred
characteristics through tools such as Google Ad Settings [6] [40]. However, using these
tools for audits has gotten significantly more difficult in the intervening years. Many sites,
including Google, now require an account on the service to access these tools and explicitly
forbid creating or using automated accounts in their Terms of Service. Additionally, in an
effort to reduce possible bias, many advertisers have removed the ability to specify or view
the demographic information we need. The combination of these factors made direct profile
building infeasible.
Second, this method matches the way that advertisers would determine the interests of a
user [41]. Most networks do not have detailed profile information supplied by the user and
must rely on statistical inference. Using browsing to build profiles may reveal latent bias due
to inferred data; an advertiser or network may make a decision based on a proxy attribute of
a demographic group rather than the demographic itself. This kind of bias might be missed
in an explicit profile, but would be caught with behavioral profiles.
4.1 SITE SELECTION
We gathered the representative sites from Quantcast, an internet analytics company that
provides demographic breakdowns of site visitors in the United States. The site provides
statistics on gender, age, income, ethnicity, and education [42, 43].
Relative popularity in Quantcast’s metrics is measured through the demographic index
[42]: the probability that a site visitor is a member of that demographic divided by the
likelihood that a visitor to a random site is a member of that demographic. Therefore, a
demographic index 100 for Hispanic visitors would say that there is no difference in the
number of Hispanic visitors from what would be expected on any random site, where a 200
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would demonstrate that twice as many visitors are Hispanic than average.
When selecting sites, we chose sites that had a demographic index above 140 for gender
and ethnic minorities, or above 120 for Caucasian sites. We chose a second threshold for
Caucasian users because a small increase in the demographic index for a significant majority
group implies a sizable decrease in the number of minority visitors. More specifically, a
demographic index for Caucasian visitors of 120 suggests that 90% of the site’s visitors are
Caucasian, significantly more than the 75% baseline.
In order to create the list of sites, or “playlist”, for each demographic, researchers browsed
the top 500 sites on Quantcast’s rankings and selected all of those marked as directly mea-
sured by the network. We then discarded any that did not publish audience metrics. Finally,
we sorted through and collected any sites that matched the demographic index threshold
and put them on their corresponding lists.
We removed any sites that had a significantly large demographic index in other areas,
specifically age and income. Income of the agents must be controlled since it is legal to
discriminate in housing based on income, and therefore a strong correlation between a profile
and high or low income could introduce legally acceptable bias into the results, invalidating
any finding of illegal bias. Although age is a protected class, removing it from the profiles
helps ensure that additional bias is not being introduced by an unmeasured variable.
A set of control sites were also selected from the top 100 most visited sites. These sites
had minimal demographic skew, and therefore should not correlate with any specific race
or gender. Separate control agents were run using these sites for training alongside the
experimental agents to ensure that personalization occurred.
Finally, we verified that each site selected uses Google tracking on their homepages. In
order to accomplish this, we tested whether the Google Ads script was loaded while rendering
the homepage. This guaranteed that each page visit would be recorded by the advertising
network under test.
Each agent visited between twelve and fourteen sites over three sessions during training.
The agent stayed each site for roughly one minute and scrolled around the page in order
to mimic human behavior. The exact time and behavior were randomized to avoid bot
detection. In all, training a profile took roughly one hour.
4.2 PROFILE VALIDATION
One of the main challenges we had in training profiles was validating them; i.e. whether
the assigned gender or race to a profile is correct. While there was no direct way to ensure
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if a profile is completely accurate, we used a proxy method to measure the accuracy of the
profile building process.
The key to this method is finding a feature that is independent from those used to train
the profile, but correlated with the desired demographic. For example, if the desired demo-
graphic were college-aged students, measuring a significant increase in the number of ads
for apartments advertised as “Close to Campus” would strongly indicate that the correct
demographic profile had been learned.
This method has several strengths that make it desirable for these audits. For one, it is
entirely indirect: it does not assume that the advertising system has explicitly labeled the
desired demographic value, only that it knows correlations between interest groups, and that
the profile fits within the desired set of connected interests.
Additionally, this method can be extended to new advertising networks with relative ease.
Direct measurements through tools such as settings pages [6] require modifying the audit
system for every new network. This proxy method can be updated and extended by verifying
that the training pages visited and the ads or pages collected are covered by the new network.
4.2.1 Gender Validation
To validate whether the assigned gender to a profile was accurate, we investigated the ad
category of apparel (clothing and jewelry) that the majority of its ads were clearly gendered,
either by the style or model featured. We categorized these advertisements manually, looking
up items if the intended gender was unclear. Any unclear items that were not explicitly
gendered on the seller’s website were left uncategorized.
Once all of the apparel related ads were categorized, we counted the numbers of male and
female ads for each agent. We then performed an ANOVA test to determine whether there
was a statistically significant correlation between the number of female ads and the gender of
the agent. The test showed a statistically significant difference (p = 0.048), which supports
our hypothesis that the advertising network learned the intended gender of the agents.
4.2.2 Race Validation
While we could not validate all categories of races, we used Spanish vs. English language to
distinguish between Hispanic and other races. In order to do so, we categorized the Spanish
ads and compared the frequency of these ads between Hispanic and non-Hispanic profiles.
We found that while Hispanic profiles received some Spanish ads, none of the non-Hispanic
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profiles ever received a Spanish ad. This, while not comprehensive, suggests that our profile
training method seems to have distinguished between Hispanic and non-Hispanic races.
As discussed earlier, this method is a starting point to validate the profile building process
in algorithmic audit techniques.
4.3 LIMITATIONS
While we believe that our methods are robust and accurate, the structure and ecosystem
of online advertising present new difficulties when compared to previous audits.
The primary limitation of this experimental method is validating whether advertisers
have inferred the desired data. In traditional audits the agents either met with real-estate
agents in person or sent correspondence with personal information. This guaranteed that
the person or group under audit knew the protected information regardless of whether they
used it. Using direct methods such as Google Ad Settings allows a researcher to verify that
the desired information was present in the listed interests. However, with inferred profiles it
is difficult to verify that the correct attributes have been learned.
Another difficulty is undesired correlation during profile building. Individual fairness is
not sensitive population-wide statistics, but profile systems are designed to make statistical
deductions from known data. Therefore, if presented two profiles, one is Caucasian and the
other African American but equal in all other known aspects, the advertiser may reasonably
deduce that the African American user has a lower income. Although this may be true on
average [44], this is illegal discrimination according to the FHA.
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CHAPTER 5: ADVERTISING AUDIT
The first audit concerns housing-related ads served to users while browsing the internet.
Our goal was to determine whether the number of housing related ads served to an agent
was correlated with their gender or race.
5.1 DATA COLLECTION
Trained profiles searched for housing and collected the ads they were served. Three main
categories of sites were chosen for ad collection: Google search results, local newspapers’
online housing listings, and national news homepages. Each site serves ads through Google’s
AdSense network, which ensured that an agent’s profile could be correlated across all the
sites visited during training and data collection. Search results were chosen as a source of
data due to the high proportion of relevant ads. A collection of different search terms were
used by each agent, focusing on houses for sale or rent in the surrounding area. The terms
included “houses for sale in [location]”, “[location] rentals”, and “houses in [location]”. The
local newspapers were chosen due to the relevant page topics and high number of display
advertising slots served. The national news pages were chosen as they target a neutral
audience, and because they provides a good baseline for the ads an agent would see on
non-housing sites.
In addition to the text, image, or frame-grab of an ad, we collected relevant metadata
including information about the search term used, time of day, target URL, and the agent
that collected the ad. We did not collect the position of each ad because the framework code
that retrieves the location of an element returned erroneous results.
5.2 AD CATEGORIZATION
The next step after visiting the aforementioned websites was finding and categorizing the
housing ads.
Although the question of how many overall housing-related ads were seen is important, it
gives very little information on how the users’ treatment differed. It was important to have
more detailed descriptions of the content of advertisement in order to better understand the
mechanics of the advertising networks and investigate possible explanations for behavior.
To this end we defined categories of ads, focusing on of sellers and their relationship to
the user. This was done so that we could determine if any particular class of advertiser
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displayed bias, rather than measuring the entire ecosystem at once.
Ads were placed into one of the following categories:
• Listing:
– Sale Listing: An ad to purchase a specific property or community. The ad must
state either the address or name of the property, and it must be currently on the
market.
– Rental Listing: An ad to rent a specific property or community. Like listing
ads it must give the property information in the ad. This includes short-term
rentals.
• Seller:
– Realtor: An advertisement for a real-estate agent, group, or property manager.
These ads must be directly associated with a professional who can broker a prop-
erty sale or rental.
– Rental Group: An ad for a company or group that facilitates rentals, but does
not own or manage the properties themselves. Companies like AirBnB fall in this
category.
– Foreclosure: Ads for search engines and sellers specializing in foreclosed prop-
erties. These ads use the term “foreclosed” or “bank-owned” property in their
text.
– Rent-to-Own: An ad for a rent-to-own seller. Any ad that used the term “rent-
to-own” was included in this category, unless it contained a sale or rental listing
that was currently for sale.
• Listing Aggregator: A search engine or site that collects other listings.
• Property Search Engine: A service that collects and searches property information,
but is not primarily intended for buying/selling
• Loans: Ads that directly reference housing related loans such as mortgage services.
Does not include credit card ads, savings accounts, or other general banking ads.
• Unrelated: Any ad that does not fall into one of the above categories.
Many papers have introduced novel techniques for determining which ads are relevant. One
method described by Liu et al. is to leverage machine learning to classify advertisements [45].
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Race Gender Agents Ads
African American
Female 94 2540
Male 92 2665
Asian
Female 94 2720
Male 98 2729
Caucasian
Female 94 2630
Male 92 2755
Hispanic
Female 95 2596
Male 95 2668
Control 12 437
Table 5.1: The number of agents in each demographic group, and the total number of ads
seen by them.
They did this by detecting which ads differ in topic from the page content, and are therefore
likely targeted. Another method was described in Adscape [41]. This leverages Google’s
AdSettings page with manual classification in order to estimate the proportion of ads served
that were targeted to the user.
The number of important categories and inclusion of image and video ads made manual
classification the most sensible method. Although it was more labor intensive than many
alternatives, it allowed greater accuracy when dealing with subtle distinctions in the type
of ads, as well as collecting information about the contents of non-text advertisements.
Categorization was performed in batches by a single researcher, working from a list of unique
advertisements collected.
5.3 RESULTS
We collected ads from 766 different trained profile agents each assigned to one of nine
distinct treatments - roughly 95 of each of the eight experimental treatments and 12 of
the control. The experiment collected 21, 740 ads in total, of which 2, 262 were unique. A
detailed breakdown by demographic is included in table 5.1.
First, we filtered out any ads irrelevant to the specific topic of interest. Next we grouped
the agents by gender and race and counted the number of ads seen of the specific category.
Once the ads had been counted, we compared the number of ads observed by each group
using a two-way ANOVA test. This is a multi-level statistical test that can test the signif-
icance of several variables simultaneously. This made it a very good match for our data as
we could test both demographic variables in a single experiment.
The ANOVA test requires the data to be normal and homogeneous in order to make
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Female Male
African American 15.170 16.739
Asian 16.383 16.133
Caucasian 16.149 17.967
Hispanic 15.653 15.916
Table 5.2: The average number of housing-related ads seen per agent. Caucasian men see
significantly more housing-related ads than any other group, and African American women
see significantly fewer.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 4 1018.18 254.54 2.30 0.0569
Gender 1 273.89 273.89 2.48 0.1159
Race & Gender 3 388.93 129.64 1.17 0.3192
Residuals 1106 122331.01 110.61
Table 5.3: The results of a two-way ANOVA test with the number of ads seen as dependent
on the agent’s gender and race. The p-value for race is not quite lower than the standard 0.05
level, but suggests that there may be some differential treatment, even if it is not statistically
significant.
accurate conclusions, so this was verified before the statistical analysis. These assumptions
were verified using the Fligner-Killeen test for homogeneity of variance, the Shapiro-Wilk
normality test, and inspection of both the Residual vs. Fitted and Normal Q-Q plots.
If the data was satisfactorily well-behaved, we performed the ANOVA test and recorded the
results. Since the data for several categories of ads did not match the underlying assumptions
of the statistical test, we only make conclusions in categories where they were valid.
5.3.1 Overall Housing Ads
The first comparison was whether there was any bias in the overall housing-related ads.
This combined all of the coded categories above, except for unrelated ads. We saw 12, 418
housing-related ads, with the average number seen per-demographic in table 5.2.
In general the values are clustered between 15.50 and 16.50, except for Caucasian men who
saw substantially more housing ads, and African American women who saw substantially
fewer. Although these numbers suggest there may be some difference in treatment, statistical
analysis is needed to make a certain claim.
In table 5.3 we can see that the ANOVA test does not detect significant bias in any area
at the p = 0.05 level. However, the p-score for race is just barely above at p = 0.0569. This,
combined with the visual inspection of table 5.2 suggests that there may be some bias that
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Female Male
African-American 0.617 0.620
Asian 0.585 0.510
Caucasian 0.532 0.652
Hispanic 0.558 0.642
Table 5.4: The average number of listing advertisements seen by each agent over the course
of the audit. The male agents see more listings on average, except for Asian agents.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 3 5.29 1.76 0.79 0.4982
Gender 1 0.75 0.75 0.34 0.5610
Race & Gender 3 0.71 0.24 0.11 0.9559
Residuals 193 428.46 2.22
Table 5.5: The results of a two-way ANOVA test with the agent’s gender and race as
independent variables and the number of listing advertisements as the dependent variable.
is being obscured by the number of degrees of freedom.
In order to investigate this further, we analyzed the data pair-wise: selecting one subset of
the dataset and comparing it to its complement. Running the ANOVA test only comparing
two racial-groups (Caucasian and non-Caucasian) shows a significant difference (p = 0.033)
in treatment, while the other three permutations show a significance value close to the origi-
nal. This demonstrates that, while there may not be significant differences when considering
all variables at once, the treatment of Caucasian agents was significantly different than the
treatment of others. Since the data for Caucasian visitors never made up more than one
third of the data under consideration, this bias was not as clear to the original method of
analysis.
5.3.2 Listing Ads
We see a different story with listing ads (sale listing and rental listing categories). We were
able to collect 444 listing ads, with the breakdown of counts in table 5.4. As in table 5.2,
Caucasian men saw the most advertisements of this type, however in this category Asian men
saw the fewest. In general, male visitors saw more listing ads than their female counterparts,
except for Asian visitors where the pattern reversed.
We do not see any significant bias in the number of listings using the multi-factor ANOVA
test (table 5.5). Unlike the previous category, there is no evidence of bias found by pairwise
tests either. While this is an encouraging result, we cannot conclude that the system is
unbiased in this area without further analysis. This topic will be discussed at greater length
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in section 7.2.
5.3.3 Rent-to-Own Ads
One area of housing loans that is particularly interesting is that of Rent-to-Own (RtO)
properties. Also known as “contract-for-deed” arrangement, they promise the deed to a
property (or the option to purchase the deed) upon completion of contract terms, usually
including a set period of on-time payments and paying both taxes and upkeep for the prop-
erty.
There has been significant discussion about the conditions of these agreements, with the
various state investigators and the US Department of Defense describing them as a form of
predatory lending [46, 47], but then concluding that this type of sale was not a credit sale,
but a lease. They are generally targeted at low-income buyers, and previous lawsuits have
alleged that these companies specifically target African American buyers and neighborhoods.
In our analysis we saw that African-American men received more ads for this type of loan
than any other group. This conclusion is supported by the pairwise tests in tables 5.6 to 5.9
that show the respective ANOVA results for each test.
Looking at table 5.6, we can see that there is a significant correlation (p = 0.007) between
the gender and race of the user and the number of RtO ads seen. This confirms that African-
American men see more of these ads compared to other groups, and supports the conclusion
that these dangerous lending practices are often targeted towards minorities.
5.3.4 Other Categories of Ads
We did not see any significant differences in treatment for any other categories of housing
ads. This was due to a few limiting factors. First of all, several categories had very few ads,
which made error bounds too large for reasonable conclusions. Secondly, several categories
had bimodal distributions of views. In these, a few agents saw ads many times, but most
agents never saw any. This violates many of the assumptions of the ANOVA test, and also
compounded the first limitation. Finally, a few of the categories were sufficiently large, but
failed one or more of the assumptions.
The first and third limitations may be addressed in the future with significantly larger
sample sizes. The second, however, is likely to be a problem regardless of the sample size due
to the behavior of online advertisements; ads tend to “follow” a user to increase effectiveness.
Thus, alternative analysis may be necessary for situations where this is common.
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 1 40.12 40.12 2.43 0.1226
Gender 1 4.72 4.72 0.29 0.5940
Race & Gender 1 125.30 125.30 7.59 0.0071
Residuals 88 1452.85 16.51
Table 5.6: Pairwise comparison of the number of RtO ads seen. Comparing African-
American users to all others.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 1 1.41 1.41 0.08 0.7824
Gender 1 2.61 2.61 0.14 0.7073
Race & Gender 1 2.81 2.81 0.15 0.6967
Residuals 88 1616.18 18.37
Table 5.7: Pairwise comparison of the number of RtO ads seen. Comparing Asian users to
all others.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 1 15.29 15.29 0.84 0.3609
Gender 1 2.28 2.28 0.13 0.7236
Race & Gender 1 10.01 10.01 0.55 0.4594
Residuals 88 1595.41 18.13
Table 5.8: Pairwise comparison of the number of RtO ads seen. Comparing Caucasian users
to all others.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 1 1.11 1.11 0.06 0.8050
Gender 1 2.68 2.68 0.15 0.7013
Race & Gender 1 23.41 23.41 1.29 0.2590
Residuals 88 1595.79 18.13
Table 5.9: Pairwise comparison of the number of RtO ads seen. Comparing Hispanic users
to all others.
21
CHAPTER 6: RANKING AUDIT
The other audit we performed was an analysis of whether the gender or race of a user is
correlated with the ranking of recommended property search results. This analysis focused
specifically on online listing services.
In order to select sites for this audit we performed an initial survey of several of the most
popular online listing services, including Zillow, Trulia, Redfin, Realtor.com, Homesnap, and
Forsalebyowner.com. A site could be considered only if it met a few criteria: First, it must
have an algorthmically generated “recomended” sort. This immediately ruled out a few sites
that only sorted based on concrete characteristics. Second, that sort must be personalized.
Zillow and Redfin were removed as they did not exhibit any personalization. Both display
pre-generated recommendations that were identical for every agent that visited the site.
Finally, we chose sites that allowed scraping the pages of interest in their robots.txt files.
This was to done in order to be “good neighbors” to these sites by following best practices.
All of the remaining sites fulfilled this requirement.
This survey left us with two popular listing sites to audit: Trulia.com and Realtor.com.
Both republish MLS and allow searching properties for rental or sale. Additionally, both
default to a personalized sort and include Schema.org metadata in their search pages. This
simplified data collection and reduced the number of requests to the respective sites.
6.1 DATA COLLECTION
In the data collection process, the trained browser profile visited the homepage and sub-
mitted the desired location using the main search bar. When the results were returned, the
program verified that they were sorted using the personalized sort. On Trulia this is called
“Just for you”, and “Relevant Listings” on Realtor.com. If they were not sorted correctly,
the desired sort was selected from the drop-down box. The program then scrolled down the
page while extracting the metadata for each listing from the page’s HTML. We collected
the unique ids of the listings along with their addresses, latitude and longitude, number of
bedrooms and bathrooms, and price.
We discarded any commercial properties or listings above $1.5 million dollars after veri-
fying that there was no correlation between the number of properties of this kind and the
gender or race of the user.
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 3 7.1× 1010 2.4× 1010 0.211 0.8886
Gender 1 3.3× 1011 3.3× 1011 2.929 0.0870
Position 1 2.0× 1013 2.0× 1013 177.7 < 0.001
Gender, Race 3 4.0× 1011 1.3× 1011 1.181 0.3153
Race, Position 3 2.8× 1011 9.2× 1010 0.824 0.4805
Gender, Position 1 5.8× 1011 5.8× 1011 5.240 0.0221
Gender, Race, Position 3 1.8× 1011 5.9× 1010 0.532 0.6602
Residuals 6545 7.3× 1014 1.1× 1011
Table 6.1: A three-way ANOVA test on the dataset collected from Realtor.com with an
agent’s gender and race and a listing’s position as the independent variables, and the listing’s
price as the dependent variable. We can see a significant interaction between gender and
position, implying that the rankings are ordered differently by price depending on the gender
of the user.
6.2 PRICING RESULTS
We used a similar technique to analyze the rankings as we did the advertisements. For each
listing service we performed a multi-factor ANOVA test with the profile variables (gender
and race) and the ranking position as independent variables, and the listing attributes (price,
number of bedrooms, distance) as the dependent variable.
We expect to see no direct correlation between either of the profile variables and the
index, as the count and frequency of the indexes is identical between all measurements.
The applicable tests for this audit are those that measure the correlation between one of
the profile variables and one of the listing attributes. Statistically significant correlation of
this type implies that the listing attribute is weighted differently depending on the user’s
demographics.
We also verified that personalization did not effect other attributes of the listings. Most
importantly, we did not see differential pricing on any site we surveyed. This is a welcome
departure from the 2012 HUD audit that found substantial price discrimination in one-on-one
interactions [2].
6.2.1 Realtor.com
We collected 436 measurements from Realtor.com over the course of three months. Each
of these records contains the metadata for each of the top 30 listings as well as the time
collected, unique identifier of the browser profile, and the trained gender and race of the
profile. In total we collected information on 789 distinct properties.
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Figure 6.1: Average price of listings at a given index, comparing Realtor.com and Trulia.com.
Notice that Realtor.com starts with more expensive properties and tends towards cheaper
ones as you go down the list, where Trulia maintains a fairly stable average price.
Female Male
African American 378,123.30 343,618.80
Asian 338,620.70 364,870.80
Caucasian 395,230.90 317,609.40
Hispanic 359,624.90 344,917.60
Table 6.2: The average price (in USD) of listings seen on Realtor.com for housing searches
in Chicago IL.
Next we performed a multi-factor ANOVA test on the provided data. The results of the
test are contained in section 6.2.1. The most immediately obvious result is that the position
of a listing is highly correlated with its price. We can see this correlation plotted in fig. 6.1.
The effect of this is that the average price of a listing on Realtor.com decreases as you scroll
down the suggestions.
We can also see that there is a statistically significant (p = 0.022) correlation between
gender, position, and price in the results. This follows the strong correlation between position
and price, but implies that men and women receive different orderings than men. While the
results of this statistical test give us evidence of bias, they do not describe the ways in which
the system treats users differently.
Looking at the correlation between gender, position, and ranking in fig. 6.2, we see that
women are presented more expensive properties than men at the top of the list, but less
expensive properties as they move down the list. The trend lines cross around position 15,
half-way down the ranking.
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Female Male
African American 224,921.70 224,172.60
Asian 226,058.70 220,708.50
Caucasian 220,961.40 227,589.70
Hispanic 217,756.30 230,006.20
Table 6.3: The average price (in USD) of listings seen on Realtor.com for housing searches
in Champaign and Urbana IL.
Figure 6.2: Comparison of average listing price at a given index by gender. While the trend-
line of the average price for women starts above the one for men, the two cross at index
16.
We also see a large spike in average price at index 17. Upon inspection we discovered that
this spot is often used for larger, more expensive properties such as penthouse apartments.
We can also look at the houses served to the agents. Table 6.2 lists the average listing price
seen by each race for Chicago, and table 6.3 gives the averages for the Champaign/Urbana
area. In Chicago we see that the trend of women being served more expensive properties
holds, except for Asian users. Asian women were served significantly cheaper properties than
their male counterparts.
This pattern reverses in the smaller town, however. In the Champaign/Urbana area men
receive recommendations for slightly more expensive properties. Once again, the trend is
swapped for Asian agents, with Asian women receiving more expensive recommendations.
6.2.2 Trulia.com
On Trulia we collected 118 measurements over the course of one and a half months. Like
Realtor.com, we collected the listing information as well as metadata about the scraping
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Race 3 6.3× 109 2.1× 109 0.14 0.9372
Gender 1 9.7× 108 9.7× 108 0.06 0.8013
Position 1 1.9× 1011 1.9× 1011 12.63 0.0004
Gender, Race 3 1.3× 1010 4.3× 109 0.28 0.8375
Race, Position 3 3.0× 109 1.0× 109 0.07 0.9780
Gender, Position 1 1.4× 109 1.4× 109 0.09 0.7605
Gender, Race, Position 3 3.4× 109 1.1× 109 0.07 0.9742
Residuals 9274 1.4× 1014 1.5× 1010
Table 6.4: A three-way ANOVA test on the dataset collected from Trulia.com with an agent’s
gender and race and a listing’s position as the independent variables, and the listing’s price
as the dependent variable.
Female Male
African American 211,871.50 214,731.00
Asian 211,399.20 217,588.40
Caucasian 215,972.70 213,385.90
Hispanic 212,214.00 214,387.50
Table 6.5: The average price (in USD) of listings seen on Trulia.com for housing searches in
Champaign and Urbana IL.
profile.
The results of the multi-factor ANOVA test are shown in table 6.4. Our results do not
show evidence of any statistically significant discrimination on either gender or bias.
Although we do not see significantly different rankings between different races, there are
still some differences between the listings seen. For example, tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the
average house price by race. In contrast with the Realtor.com results, we see the largest
difference between the Asian and Hispanic agents, with the others falling between. The
higher average cost for Asian agents is especially interesting as it is far more different than
the average than any of the others.
Female Male
African American 1,394,098.00 1,320,769.00
Asian 1,215,298.00 1,115,562.00
Caucasian 1,258,380.00 1,316,573.00
Hispanic 1,313,913.00 1,219,628.00
Table 6.6: The average price (in USD) of listings seen on Trulia.com for housing searches in
Chicago IL.
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African American Asian Caucasian Hispanic p-value
Douglas 18 12 16 16 0.747
Calumet Heights 12 10 12 11 0.970
Kenwood 10 10 9 10 0.994
Washington Park 20 21 22 20 0.987
West Lawn 12 11 12 12 0.996
Table 6.7: A comparison between Douglas, the most racially disparate neighborhood in the
Trulia results, compared to a random sample of four other neighborhoods from that dataset.
We can see that listings in this area were seen less by Asian agents than any other racial
group.
African American Asian Caucasian Hispanic p-value
Lake View 8 15 19 21 0.099
Loop 8 7 9 8 0.969
Norwood Park 5 4 6 5 0.940
Cicero 8 10 5 5 0.630
Chatham 9 11 11 10 0.966
Table 6.8: Comparison between neighborhoods comparing all 30 listings collected for each
page
6.3 GEOGRAPHICAL DISCRIMINATION RESULTS
Another area of interest for this audit was whether the race of a user influenced the
neighborhoods they were recommended. This type of bias can be thought of as a companion
to redlining, where lenders restrict mortgages in certain neighborhoods on the basis of race
[48, 49]. This leads to indirect segregation: members of minority groups are technically
allowed to move outside their neighborhoods, but are prevented from doing so because
they are unable to find funding. This results in racially segregated communities as well as
depriving minority groups from building greater net worth [50, 51].
This portion of the audit uses the same set of data as the other ranking experiments, but
a different statistical test. Because we are interested in how many users are recommended
each neighborhood, we use a simple χ2-test rather than the ANOVA. We compare the actual
distribution for each neighborhood to the expected distribution, and if the p-value is lower
than the threshold p = 0.05 we conclude that there is biased treatment.
We saw very little variance in the number of times a neighborhood was seen by each
racial group on Trulia. The χ2 tests summarized in table 6.7 showed that the lowest p-value
is the Douglas neighborhood, with p = 0.7468. Thus there is no evidence of geographic
discrimination for Trulia.com.
We see a very different story from Realtor.com. Looking at all of the listings in table 6.8,
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African American Asian Caucasian Hispanic p-value
Lake View 7 15 19 21 0.060
Loop 7 5 8 7 0.872
Norwood Park 5 4 6 5 0.940
Cicero 8 10 5 5 0.624
Chatham 9 11 11 10 0.974
Table 6.9: Comparison between neighborhoods comparing the top 15 listings collected for
each page
we see that there is one neighborhood, Lake View, that that is significantly different at
the p = 0.1 level. Further restricting to the top 15 listings in the ranking (table 6.9, this
value decreases further, implying that the neighborhood is not only shown less to African
American users, but it is shown further down as well.
Although this is not a conclusive demonstration of geographical discrimination, it does
open the door for further exploration in this area.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
In this paper we described two audits on online housing markets; the first studying online
ad targeting and the second measuring the effects of personalized search result ranking.
In the first audit we found differences in the number of housing ads shown on the basis of
race, and concluded that Caucasian agents saw significantly more housing-related advertise-
ments than other agents who searched for housing. This implies that the advertiser’s target
audiences were more closely aligned with the Caucasian group, leading to indirect bias. The
first audit also found that advertisements for predatory Rent-to-Own programs were seen
by African American users significantly more than any other group.
The second audit uncovered evidence of gender bias in the ordering of suggested prop-
erties on the online housing site Realtor.com. Women were recommended more expensive
properties towards the top of the list, and less expensive properties towards the bottom. We
also concluded that African American users were significantly less likely to be recommended
houses in the Lake View neighborhood of Chicago. While this may be unintentional, tech-
niques like this have been used in the past to enforce indirect segregation by pricing minorities
out of desirable neighborhoods [52].
While our results show some bias in these systems, we do not claim that any laws have
been broken. Further audits would be required to show a pattern of systematic bias in one
of these platforms.
7.1 ALTERNATE DEFINITIONS OF FAIRNESS
The Fair Housing Act and existing housing audits focus specifically on individual fairness.
However, this definition of fairness does not consider the ways that systematic bias based on
a protected class can create inequalities in other areas. The 2012 Housing Discrimination
Study notes that paired-testing studies require choosing non-representative testers from their
respective demographics, and that this may mask group unfairness [2]. Indirect audits such
as the one described here can be modified to measure this by favoring representative profiles
over paired profiles.
7.2 CONCLUDING AN ABSENCE OF BIAS
While we can compare differences in the two results, our current statistical methods cannot
conclude that there is no bias in this system. This follows the historical focus on the presence
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of bias rather than its absence. A 2017 paper by Thebault-Spieker et al. demonstrated
methods of proving the absence of bias in online 5-star ranking systems [12]. While their
methods are not directly applicable to this type of audit, the integrating similar ideas could
greatly strengthen future housing audits.
We did not find any significant evidence of bias in the ranking of properties on Trulia.com.
Once again, we cannot conclude that the system is not biased, but the lack of obvious
discrimination is an important result. The goal of any fairness audit is to detect bias so that
it can be resolved, and negative results are an important part of that process.
7.3 REPRODUCIBILITY
One weakness of these audits is a lack of reproducibility. Practically every factor in these
systems is constantly evolving, from the set of ads currently being served, to the targeting
and pricing of an advertising campaign, and even the way user profiles are interpreted. This
puts researchers in a difficult position: auditors must collect as much data as possible in
order to catch any confounding variables, and must carefully validate that the system they
are measuring did not change substantially during the course of their audit.
Researchers looking to replicate the findings of an audit like these can use the same tools
and methods as the original experiment, but should be very aware that any number of
variables may have changed between their measurements and the originals, and therefore
lead to very different results.
7.4 CONSEQUENCES OF TARGETING
It is important for online advertising companies to consider whether targeted housing ads
are desirable for their business. These ads open up an area of legal and ethical liability
that may not be offset by potential benefits. This has been demonstrated recently in two
complaints against Facebook, one of the largest online advertising companies; a complaint
by HUD (Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing & Equal Opportunity v. Facebook) and a
lawsuit by the National Fair Housing Alliance (18 Civ. 2689). These complaints focus on the
platform’s tools which allow potential advertisers to select which demographics to include
or exclude in their audience, and demonstrate that advertisers can discriminate directly by
not showing ads based on gender, disability, familial status, religion, and/or national origin.
Additionally, a recent study by Ali et al. [31] showed that explicit discrimination is not
necessary to produce prejudiced outcomes. In the study they made several ad purchases
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on Facebook in several employment and housing related topics, and then tracked the de-
mographics of the users who saw their ads. Although they did not target these ads to any
specific demographic, they saw significant skew in the demographics of the users who re-
ceived the ads. For example, ads for jobs in the lumber industry reached an audience that
was 72% white and 90% male, while ads for cashier positions reached 75% African-American
audience. Even more concerning is the fact that the discriminatory appears to be a byprod-
uct of automated classification and image recognition. This creates a system where bias is
practically inevitable, whether the advertiser desires it or not.
This type of bias is unlikely to be confined to Facebook. In fact, Facebook may have the
best tooling to both find and reduce this type of discrimination due to their detailed user
profiles. More opaque advertising systems, such as Google’s, require indirect tests such as
the ones described in this paper since the platforms do not report on the demographics of
the users who received an ad.
7.5 DETECTING AND RESOLVING BIAS
Many sites address the liability caused by personalized recommendations by serving an
algorithmically sorted list to all visitors and refreshed regularly. This guarantees that two
users with the same query at the same time will receive the same recommendations. For areas
where fairness is legally required, such as housing and employment, this can be a prudent
alternative. The algorithm may still perpetuate existing bias by under- or over-representing
certain neighborhoods and communities, but the system as a whole would be fair under this
style of paired-testing audit.
If a service provider chooses to serve targeted housing ads or listings, it is important
that they regularly audit their own systems for fairness. This is especially important if the
service uses opaque or uninterpretable decision-making systems. These would preferably be
performed by an unbiased third-party, but could also be accomplished by an isolated team
within the company.
Finally, companies should open up access to their systems for fully independent auditing.
As it currently stands, external audits not officially sanctioned by the company run the risk
of violating the site’s Terms of Service, especially if the researchers access the site using
automated tools. As long as these sites are not open to external experiments, the public has
no way to verify that they meet the legal standard of fairness.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Our two audits investigate important emerging areas of housing fairness: online advertising
and search-result ranking. While in some of the explored categories, our results demonstrate
that a user’s treatment is dependent on a protected class (either race or gender), there are
also many categories that we did not find any types of bias. We argue that both of these
results are equivalently important as both serve the goal of conducting an audit.
The proposed audit framework can provide a foundation for further audits going forward.
The most recent Housing Discrimination Study [2] surveyed 28 metropolitan areas across
the United States of America in order to provide a conservative measure of housing discrimi-
nation in the county. An online audit of this scale would certainly be a sizeable undertaking,
but the lower requirements for participants, travel, and other logistical concerns could make
it feasible to conduct on a more regular basis than the roughly ten year pattern of existing
audits.
The profile building technique we have used in our auditing platform is also adaptable.
An auditor can add new categories or variables simply by changing the sites visited, the
training schedule, or the agent’s behavior while browsing a page. Even attributes such as
the IP address and browser used can be modified in order to build a more representative
profile. These behavioral models could be further strengthened by user studies providing
truly representative browsing data.
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APPENDIX A: SITE PLAYLISTS
Listing A.1: Control Sites
amazon.com
google.com
facebook.com
wikipedia.org
twitter.com
youtube.com
ebay.com
yahoo.com
walmart.com
quora.com
craigslist.org
nytimes.com
paypal.com
target.com
bing.com
Listing A.2: Male
cnbc.com
gizmodo.com
deviantart.com
drudgereport.com
politico.com
deadspin.com
jalopnik.com
theverge.com
bodybuilding.com
gfycat.com
thechive.com
stackoverflow.com
washingtonexaminer.com
kotaku.com
polygon.com
tiebreaker.com
sbnation.com
androidcentral.com
westernjournal.com
flightaware.com
streamable.com
comicbook.com
liveleak.com
Listing A.3: Female
goodreads.com
thoughtcatalog.com
quizlet.com
thekitchn.com
thepennyhoarder.com
king.com
hometalk.com
yourtango.com
findagrave.com
petfinder.com
sixflags.com
romper.com
patient.info
apartmenttherapy.com
getitfree.us
Listing A.4: African American
urbandictionary.com
nickiswift.com
bodybuilding.com
quizlet.com
theroot.com
tiebreaker.com
jezebel.com
sbnation.com
yourtango.com
ajc.com
getitfree.us
Listing A.5: Asian
yelp.com
urbandictionary.com
glassdoor.com
stackexchange.com
cnbc.com
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gizmodo.com
deadspin.com
lifehacker.com
variety.com
jalopnik.com
theverge.com
bodybuilding.com
gfycat.com
quizlet.com
thekitchn.com
stackoverflow.com
kotaku.com
sbnation.com
flightaware.com
androidcentral.com
streamable.com
apartmenttherapy.com
Listing A.6: Caucasian
whitepages.com
definition.org
topixoffbeat.com
kiwireport.com
worldlifestyle.com
startribune.com
cheatsheet.com
hometalk.com
westernjournal.com
findagrave.com
yourdailydish.com
petfinder.com
gardeningknowhow.com
dailykos.com
Listing A.7: Hispanic
urbandictionary.com
theverge.com
bodybuilding.com
gfycat.com
quizlet.com
kotaku.com
univision.com
polygon.com
yourtango.com
sixflags.com
androidcentral.com
axs.com
streamable.com
comicbook.com
liveleak.com
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